Even the best laid plans are not enough to respond to a national emergency if those plans are not effectively carried out. Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast with a vengeance, leaving utter devastation and destruction in its wake. Katrina has been considered the hurricane of the century by many, the storm New Orleans feared since the city’s birth. New Orleans and her inhabitants will never be the same.

• Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Mississippi/Louisiana border on Aug. 29, 2005. (“Climate of 2005: Summary of Hurricane Katrina,” U.S. Department of Commerce National Climatic Data Center, 12/29/05)
  
• After several sections of the New Orleans’ levee system were breached on August 29, 80 percent of the city was flooded; some areas were under 20 feet of water. (“A Failure of Initiative,” House Committee on Government Reform,” 2/15/06)
  
• The hurricane displaced 200,000 Louisianans and 66,000 Mississippians from their homes. (Ibid.)
  
• More than 1,500 people died in Louisiana as a result of Hurricane Katrina. (Hurricane Katrina Deceased Victims, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, 5/30/06)
  
• Mississippi lost at least 231 people to Hurricane Katrina. (“A Failure of Initiative,” House Committee on Government Reform,” 2/15/06)

It was obvious to the millions of viewers watching the nightmare play out on their televisions that something had gone very wrong in both the preparation and execution of the response plan for this weather event. After all, this was not the nation’s first experience with a large hurricane  nor was it the first substantial disaster requiring a coordinated response by officials at the local,  state and federal level. By week’s end, policy makers in Congress were calling for a comprehensive review of what had happened.

Findings of the House Committee’s Report:

• The accuracy and timeliness of National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center forecasts prevented further loss of life
  
• A previous hurricane exercise (the Hurricane Pam exercise) reflected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking New Orleans
  
• Levees protecting New Orleans were not built for the most severe hurricanes
  
• The failure of complete evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in relief
  
• Critical elements of the National Response Plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all
  
• DHS and the states were not prepared for this catastrophic event
  
• Massive communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness
  
• Command and control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief
  
• The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking
  
• The collapse of local law enforcement and lack of effective public communications led to civil unrest and further delayed relief
  
• Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and difficulties coordinating efforts
  
• Long-standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing
  
• FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained provision of commodities
  
• Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red Cross and others faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process